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Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2015-CA-001617-MR
GRAND LODGE OF KENTUCKY FREE
AND ACCEPTED MASONS; PATRICIA
BOERGER; HAROLD ISERAL; JEAN
ISERAL; BOBBIE COX; JOYCE WILSON;
CHARLES WILSON, JERRY TREADWAY;
CLAIRE J. DAUGHERTY; MARGARET
OSTERHAGE; SHIRLEY BURDINE;
DONALD BEAGLE; BETTY BEAGLE;
NORA H. LEDFORD; STAN WERBRICH;
ALICE WERBRICH; JAMES STEFFEN;
SUE STEFFEN; CLARE KENTRUP; RAYMOND
KENTRUP, MORRIS REED; MARTHA
REED, JOHN NIEDEREGGER; KAY
NIEDEREGGER; JESSIE EPPINGHOFF;
MARY JO HUNT; EDWIN GINTER; CARL B.
GAMEL; MARY SUE GAMEL; ESTATE OF
PAUL TALBERT, DECEASED; AND ESTATE
OF LOUIS TALBERT, DECEASED

v.

APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY M. BARTLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 14-CI-02367

CITY OF TAYLOR MILL; AND
DARLENE PLUMMER, KENTON
COUNTY PROPERTY VALUATION
ADMINISTRATOR

APPELLEES

OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KRAMER, CHIEF JUDGE; D. LAMBERT AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Grand Lodge Of Kentucky Free and Accepted Masons (Grand
Lodge), Patricia Boerger, Harold Iseral, Jean Iseral, Bobbie Cox, Joyce Wilson,
Charles Wilson, Jerry Treadway, Claire J. Daugherty, Margaret Osterhage, Shirley
Burdine, Donald Beagle, Betty Beagle, Nora H. Ledford, Stan Werbrich, Alice
Werbrich, James Steffen, Sue Steffen, Clare Kentrup, Raymond Kentrup, Morris
Reed, Martha Reed, John Niederegger, Kay Niederegger, Jessie Eppinghoff,
Mary Jo Hunt, Edwin Ginter, Carl B. Gamel, Mary Sue Gamel, Estate of Paul
Talbert, Deceased, and Estate of Louis Talbert, Deceased (collectively referred to
as Residents) bring this appeal from an October 9, 2015, Judgment of the Kenton
Circuit Court reversing a final order of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Board of
Tax Appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The primary question raised in this appeal is whether certain real
property owned by Grand Lodge and exclusively occupied by individual senior
citizens is subject to ad valorem taxation by Kenton County or is entitled to the
charitable exemption found in Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution. To
answer this question, a thorough recitation of the underlying facts is necessary.
FACTS
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Grand Lodge is a recognized public charity entitled to the
constitutional exemption from ad valorem taxation upon real property it both owns
and occupies per Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution.1 Grand Lodge owns a
24-acre tract of real property located in the City of Taylor Mill, Kentucky. In
2001, Grand Lodge leased the 24-acre tract to Masonic Retirement Village of
Taylor Mill, Inc. (MRV). MRV was incorporated as a nonprofit and is an affiliated
corporation of Grand Lodge. The stated purpose of MRV was to provide and
maintain affordable housing to senior citizens by establishing a local retirement
community in Taylor Mill, subsequently known as Springhill Village.
Under the terms of the lease, Grand Lodge leased the real property to
MRV for twenty-four years, with the option to renew the lease for an additional
twenty-four years. Upon termination of the lease, Grand Lodge possessed an
option to purchase any improvements upon the property.
MRV began construction of Springhill Village in 2002 and ultimately
constructed forty-eight residential units upon the real property. These residential
units were available to senior citizens over fifty-five years of age who possessed
the financial means to acquire a unit. To acquire a residential unit, a resident was
required to execute a Resident Agreement. Under the terms of the Resident
Agreement, the resident would pay an “entrance fee” of $151,000 to $252,000,
depending upon the size of the particular residential unit. During the term of the
Resident Agreement, the resident acquired the exclusive right of possession in his
1

See Com. Ex. Rel. Luckett v. Grand Lodge of Kentucky, 459 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. 1970).
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or her specific residential unit until termination of the agreement. The Resident
Agreement terminated upon either the death of the resident, the physical/mental
inability of the resident to continue to reside in the unit, the resident’s relocation to
a nursing home, or the resident’s thirty-day notice of intent to terminate. Upon
termination, the resident was entitled to a “refund” of the sale price of the unit
minus certain costs incurred by MRV or, if not sold within six months by MRV,
then the resident would be “refunded” eighty-two percent of the original entrance
fee.
Since 1995, the real property comprising Springhill Village owned by
Grand Lodge and the subsequent improvements constructed thereon by MRV were
not subject to ad valorem taxation. The Kentucky Department of Revenue viewed
it as exempt property under Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution. In 2011,
Taylor Mill and Kenton County filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the
Kenton Circuit Court against the Kenton County Property Valuation Administrator
(PVA) and the Department of Revenue. Therein, Taylor Mill and Kenton County
maintained that the residential units in the Springhill Village had been leased or
exclusive possession had been transferred to private individual residents and that
such possessory interests were subject to ad valorem taxation. By agreed
declaratory judgment, it was ordered that the fair market value of the private
leaseholds or other possessory interests in the residential units at Springhill Village
were subject to ad valorem taxation.
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In the tax years of 2012, 2013, and 2014, the Kenton County PVA
issued ad valorem tax assessments upon the real property at Springhill Village. In
particular, the PVA issued to each resident an ad valorem tax assessment upon his
or her respective unit. Thereafter, the Residents appealed the ad valorem tax
assessments to the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Board of Tax Appeals (Tax
Board). Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 131.340. By a November 19, 2014,
final order, the Tax Board voided the ad valorem tax assessments issued to the
Residents of Springhill Village and concluded that the real property as a whole was
entitled to the charitable property tax exemption provided by Section 170 of the
Kentucky Constitution.2 The Tax Board determined that both the Grand Lodge and
MRV were purely public charities and entitled to the property tax exemption found
in Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution. As to the Residents, the Tax Board
noted that the Residents were not the owners of the real property and did not
possess sufficient interests in the real property to be subject to ad valorem taxation
by reason of KRS 132.195(1).
Taylor Mill and Kenton County “appealed” the Tax Board’s final
order by filing an original action in the Kenton Circuit Court. KRS 131.370. By
judgment entered October 9, 2015, the circuit court reversed the final order of the
Tax Board. The circuit court concluded that the Residents were subject to ad
valorem taxation upon their respective possessory interests pursuant to KRS
132.195(1):
At issue before the Board of Tax Appeals were property tax assessments for 2012, 2013, and
2014 tax years.
2
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In its Order voiding the assessments, the Board
noted that both the Grand Lodge and MRV are charitable
organizations which are tax exempt pursuant to Section
170 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Grand Lodge is
title owner of the real estate and MRV is deemed to be
the owner of the improvements, subject to the right of the
Grand Lodge to purchase the improvements at the end of
the ground lease. The Board concluded that the use of
the property in providing housing for senior citizens was
within the charitable purpose of MRV, and that fact
ended the discussion of whether there could be any tax
assessment.
In reaching its conclusion that neither the owners of
the property nor the residents of the units would be
subject to taxation, the Board focused on the use of the
real estate from the perspective of the title owners of the
property and improvements. In so doing, the Board
opined that the provisions of KRS 132.195 did not apply.
That statute, enacted in 1988, expressly allows for the
taxation of property, which is otherwise exempt, when
the leasehold or other interest is transferred to a natural
person or other non-exempt entity. In this case, the
Board failed to give proper recognition to the separate
interests of the residents as part of the “bundle of rights”
encompassed with the total of legal interests in the real
estate. As in the case of Freeman v. St. Andrew
Orthodox Church Inc., Ky., 294 S.W.3d 425 (2009), a
portion of real property owned by a charity can be
subject to taxation if occupied by non-exempt entities
such as renters.
This Court is of the opinion that the Freeman case
applies to the case herein. While the Grand Lodge’s fee
simple ownership in the real estate and the MRV’s
interest in the improvements are exempt, the interests of
the residents have value and, like the renters in Freeman,
are subject to assessment. Although the agreements do
not label what the residents’ legal interests are, it cannot
be said that they have no legal interests in the property.
They pay an “entrance fee” of at least $151,000.00 (the
average is $185,000.00) for the right to exclusive
occupancy and enjoyment of the residential units for life.
-6-

In addition, at termination of the agreement, the residents
have the right to a refund of 82% of their entrance fee
plus a percentage of any increase in value upon resale by
MRV. Whether they are deemed to have leasehold
interests or life estates, the residents have interests that
have value that are subject to ad valorem taxes. The fact
that the interests of the residents have restrictions, such
as the prohibition against transfer or subletting, could
affect the value but would not render such interest to be
valueless.
As stated in Iroquois Post No. 229, etc. v. City of
Louisville, Ky., 309 S.W.2d 353 (1958), the burden is on
the organization to establish clearly that it is entitled to
an exemption from payment of taxes, and the right to an
exemption must always be strictly construed. Likewise,
in Freeman, the Court noted that taxation of all property
is the rule. In this case, the issue is not whether the
ownership rights of the Grand Lodge and MRV can be
assessed, but rather whether the lesser interests of the
residents can be taxed. The total value of the residents’
interests in 48 units was assessed at $6,491,000.
Therefore, if their interests are tax exempt, 48
households, which certainly could not be considered low
income housing, in Taylor Mill and Kenton County are
receiving governmental services, but are paying no tax to
support such services.
It appears that the Legislature enacted KRS 132.195
to remedy or clarify the situation presented in this case.
While the charitable organizations retain their status as
exempt from taxation in accordance with Section 170 of
our Constitution, the individual residents are subject to
taxation on the fair value of their interests.
Order at p. 3-5 (citations omitted). This appeal follows.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision is generally
concerned with arbitrariness and is particularly set forth in KRS 13B.150:
-7-

(2) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of
the agency as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact. The court may affirm the final order
or it may reverse the final order, in whole or in part,
and remand the case for further proceedings if it finds
the agency's final order is:
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions;
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) Without support of substantial evidence on the
whole record;
(d) Arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of
discretion;
(e) Based on an ex parte communication which
substantially prejudiced the rights of any party and
likely affected the outcome of the hearing;
(f) Prejudiced by a failure of the person conducting a
proceeding to be disqualified pursuant to KRS
13B.040(2); or
(g) Deficient as otherwise provided by law.
We, of course, step into the shoes of the circuit court and review the final order of
the Tax Board in accordance with the above principles.
KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION SECTION 170 AND KRS 132.195(1)
Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution exempts from taxation real
property “owned and occupied by . . . institutions of purely public charity.” Our
case law has recognized that Section 170 was intended “to foster and encourage
benevolences to the Commonwealth.” Banahan v. Presbyterian Housing Corp.,
553 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Ky. 1977). Thus, the term “charity” was given a broad
-8-

meaning as including “activities which reasonably better the condition of
mankind.” Hancock v. Prestonburg Indus. Corp., 365 S.W.3d 199, 201 (Ky.
2012). To constitute a purely public charity under Section 170, the charity must be
“wholly altruistic in the end to be attained, and . . . no private or selfish interest
should be fostered under the guise of charity.” Id. at 201 (quoting Preachers’ Aid
Soc. v. Jacobs, 235 Ky. 790, 32 S.W.2d 343, 344 (1930)). And, the purely public
charity must both own and occupy the real property to be entitled to the tax
exemption afforded under the Section 170.
In Freeman v. St. Andrew Orthodox Church, Inc., 294 S.W.3d 425
(Ky. 2009), the terms “own and occupied” within the meaning of Section 170 was
squarely before the Kentucky Supreme Court. St. Andrew owned ten acres of real
property that was divided into two five-acre parcels. Upon each parcel, a singlefamily residence was located, and these two homes were rented to third parties,
who paid rent to St. Andrew. It was the intent of St. Andrew to eventually build
church facilities on the ten acres of real property when the financial resources were
secured to do so. As to the ten acres, it was revealed that the tenants were required
to cut the grass around their residences, and church members would cut grass upon
the remainder of the property. And, the remainder of the property was utilized by
church members for various ecclesiastical activities, including a church picnic.
PVA issued tax assessments upon the entire ten acres of property, but St. Andrew
claimed that the ten acres were exempt from taxation under Section 170 of the
Kentucky Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the tax exemption under
-9-

Section 170 was only available if the entity actually owned and occupied the real
property. The Court pointed out that St. Andrew did not occupy the single family
homes because those homes were leased to third parties. The Court specifically
held:
It simply defies reality and the plain meaning of the
constitutional provision to conclude that the church
“occupied” the houses on the subject property. This
property is occupied by tenants who pay rent to the
church.
Freeman, 294 S.W.3d at 428. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the
residential homes were “occupied” by the tenants and were not occupied by St.
Andrew. As a consequence, Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution could not
be invoked to except the two residential homes from ad valorem taxation. As to
the remainder of the ten acres, the Supreme Court believed that St. Andrew did, in
fact, own and occupy same and was thus entitled to tax exempt status under
Section 170.
Grand Lodge argues that the “owned and occupied by” analysis set
forth in Freeman, 294 S.W.3d 425 is limited to religious institutions only under
Section 170 of the Constitution. We disagree. In Freeman, the Supreme Court did
not limit its interpretation of Section 170 to churches only, but rather to all entities,
like Grand Lodge, that qualify for a tax exemption. The Court specifically held:
Accordingly, our ruling here today in defining this term
[occupied] is restricted to “institutions of religion” and
other entities qualifying for tax exemption under Section
170 of our state Constitution.
- 10 -

Freeman, 294 S.W.3d at 429.
As in Freeman, 294 S.W.3d 425, the residential units at the Springhill
Village were not “occupied” by either Grand Lodge or by MRV (the tax exempt
entities). Rather, under the plain terms of the Resident Agreements and the
undisputed facts, exclusive possession of the units was transferred to the Residents
in exchange for valuable consideration ($151,000 - $252,000). Under the “plain
meaning” of the term occupy, the residential units at Springhill Village are clearly
occupied by the Residents and not by the Grand Lodge or MRV. Freeman, 294
S.W.3d at 428. Thus, neither Grand Lodge nor MRV “occupy” the residential
units within the meaning of Section 170.
Either by design or accident, Grand Lodge/MRV have effectively
attempted to create a legal fiction in structuring an interest in real property that has
heretofore not been recognized by Kentucky Courts or the common law – that
being an “occupancy” interest in real property. We can find no legal authority in
Kentucky that recognizes an “occupancy” estate in land.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has defined property as:
[E]verything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal
or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible,
real or personal, choses [sic] in action as well as in
possession, everything which has an exchangeable value,
or which goes to make up one’s wealth or estate.
Button v. Drake, 302 Ky. 517, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69 (1946). This definition does not
recognize an “occupancy” interest in real property. Occupancy is a logical
consequence of possession of real property. Judge Palmore of the former Court of
- 11 -

Appeals, then Kentucky’s highest court, eloquently analyzed the issue, quoting
Oliver Wendall Holmes:
For most practical purposes possession is ownership as
against all but the legal titleholder. The principle was
thus stated by Holmes: ‘The consequences attached to
possession are substantially those attached to ownership,
subject to the question of the continuance of possessory
rights which I have touched upon above. Even a
wrongful possessor of a chattel may have full damages
for its conversion by a stranger to the title, or a return of
the specific thing. With regard to the legal consequences
of possession, it only remains to mention that the rules
which have been laid down with regard to chattels also
prevail with regard to land. . . .’ Holmes, The Common
Law, pp. 241, 242, 244.
Marinaro v. Deskins, 344 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Ky. 1961).
As the residential units at Springhill Village are “occupied” by the
Residents, we conclude as a matter of law that they have exclusive possession of
said units, having paid a substantial consideration, and their respective possessory
interests in the units are subject to ad valorem taxation. In particular, KRS
132.195(1) provides:
When any real or personal property which is exempt
from taxation is leased or possession is otherwise
transferred to a natural person, association, partnership,
or corporation in connection with a business conducted
for profit, the leasehold or other interest in the property
shall be subject to state and local taxation at the rate
applicable to real or personal property levied by each
taxing jurisdiction.
Under KRS 132.195(1), a leasehold or other type of possessory interest in taxexempt property is subject to taxation if transferred to a private individual. As a
- 12 -

consequence, the tax-exempt owner of real property pays no ad valorem tax, but
the private individual is subject to ad valorem taxation on the value of his
possessory interest is the tax exempt property.
Under KRS 132.195(1), the Residents are responsible for property tax
upon the value of their exclusive possessory interests in their respective residential
unit. It is clear that the Residents contractually obtained exclusive possessory
interests in the units and, by so doing, obtained valuable interests in real property.
Accordingly, we conclude the Residents’ possessory interests are subject to ad
valorem taxation under KRS 132.195(1).
VALUATION
Under the Resident Agreement, the resident was transferred the
exclusive possessory right to his respective unit. Also, each resident was required
to maintain “Tenant Homeowners’ insurance coverage,” and upon termination of
the Resident Agreement, the resident agreed to reimburse MRV for “costs incurred
. . . to repair and refurbish the Unit to any extent required beyond reasonable wear
and tear.” In many aspects, the possessory interest created by the Resident
Agreement is similar to that of a leasehold; however, the Resident Agreement also
vests additional rights in the resident not typically found in a common lease.3
While the exact property interest transferred to a resident is somewhat abstruse and
indistinct as previously discussed, it is clear that the residents obtained exclusive
Under the Resident Agreement, a resident is entitled to a partial refund of the entrance fee
($151,000 - $252,000), and the term of the Resident Agreement could be for the life of the
resident.
3
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possession of the units for a period of time. So, we think the residents’ possessory
interests in the units may be considered leaseholds for tax valuation purposes.4
The law is well-settled that a leasehold’s fair market value for taxation
purposes is obtained by subtracting the fair market value of the real property with
the leasehold from the fair market value of the real property without the leasehold.5
Ky. Dept. of Revenue v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 549 S.W.2d 297 (Ky. 1977). Hence, a
resident’s possessory interest in a unit at the Springhill Village is only taxable to
the extent of its fair market value. See Pike Cty. Bd. of Assessment v. Friend, 932
S.W.2d 378 (Ky. App. 1996); Ky. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Motel, Inc., 387
S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1965).
In this case, a review of the record reveals that the PVA neither valued
the Resident’s interest as a leasehold nor utilized the above formula to determine
the fair market value of each Resident’s possessory interest. We, therefore,
conclude that the PVA erroneously valued the Residents’ respective interests and
vacate the tax assessments upon such ground. The PVA should consider each
Resident’s possessory interest as a leasehold for valuation purposes and should
obtain the fair market value by subtracting the fair market value of the unit with the
Resident’s leasehold from the fair market value of the unit without the leasehold.

A leasehold is not ordinarily subject to ad valorem taxation as taxation is assessed against the
fee simple owner of the nonexempt real property. Fayette Co. Bd. of Supervisors v. O’Rear, 275
S.W.2d 577 (Ky. 1955).
4

While real property is assessed at its “fair cash value,” our case law establishes that “[t]he terms
‘fair cash value’ and ‘fair market value’ are synonymous.” Ky. Dept. of Revenue v. Hobart Mfg.
Co., 549 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Ky. 1977); Kentucky Revised Statutes 132.450.
5
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The difference constitutes the taxable fair market value of the Resident’s
possessory interest in a particular unit.
MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
The Residents allege that the ad valorem taxation of their respective
property interests in the units was discriminatory and resulted from the improper
collusion between the PVA and Taylor Mill. As evidence, the residents point to
the declaratory judgment action and believe that they were “intentionally
excluded” therefrom. The Residents specifically argue:
Here, the intentionally discriminatory nature of the
assessments of the Residents’ interests’ in their Units is
apparent: their interests were assessed while no other
non-commercial transferee of an interest in tax exempt
property in Taylor Mill or Kenton County has been
assessed. Indeed, the intent to discriminate was written
into the Agreed Declaratory Judgment, which prescribed
the application of KRS 132.195 to all leasehold or other
occupancy interests transferred in otherwise tax exempt
property, but went on to identify the Residents as their
sole target. This was the first, last, and only such
assessment by the Kenton County PVA of property
which was used for an exempt purpose. (Citations
omitted.)
Residents’ Brief at 22. Considering the record, we do not believe that the ad
valorem taxation of the Residents’ property interests were discriminatory or the
product of improper motives. And, the declaratory judgment action only bound the
parties thereto. The legal propriety of the ad valorem taxation of the Residents’
property interests has been adjudicated in this action.
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In summary, we are of the opinion that the Resident’s respective
possessory interests in each unit is subject to ad valorem taxation under KRS
132.195(1) and affirm the circuit court upon such conclusion. We, however, hold
that the Kenton County PVA incorrectly assessed the fair market value of each
Resident’s respective possessory interest. The PVA should obtain the fair market
value of the Resident’s specific property interest by subtracting the fair market
value of the particular unit with the Resident’s leasehold from the fair market value
of the unit without the leasehold. The difference constitutes the fair market value
of the Resident’s possessory interest in that specific unit for ad valorem taxation
purposes.
For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court
is affirmed in part, and reversed in part and remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

ALL CONCUR.
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